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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Seventh Circuit applies the 2008 ADA Amendments Act in
the 2005 EEOC v. AutoZone Case
Prior to the enactment of the 2008 Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Acti (ADAAA), one popular means of defeating a
claim of discrimination was to challenge a plaintiff's coverage under
the original Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.2 This
proved very effective, as demonstrated in a 2006 Americans Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) study that "plaintiffs have lost more than 97%
of ADA employment discrimination claims, more than under any
other civil rights statute - and the majority of these cases are being
lost because courts determine plaintiffs are not disabled."' The ADA
had lost much of its expected force in the courts where the statute's
definition of an "individual with a disability"4 had become a tripwire
for plaintiffs, who must first meet this definition in order to claim
ADA protection.' It became "[p]articularly vexing for plaintiffs ... to
show as a threshold matter that they have, or are regarded as having,
1. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2006).
3. American Civil Liberties Union, ADA RESTORATION ACT (S. 1881/I.R. 3195): A
Civil Rights Promise to Fulfill, http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-upload-file833_33633.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2011).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006).
5. Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 117 YA i L.J. 992, 994-95 (2008).
[Vol. 34:1
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'an impairment' that substantially limits a 'major life activity.'"6 The
ADA jurisprudence had given litigation under the statute a "surreal
tinge."' "For example, an employee suffering from schizophrenia,
who was refused employment after the employer told her she was
'physically and mentally incapable of having a job,' loses her case be-
cause she cannot prove that she was regarded as having a mental im-
pairment."8  Likewise, "the claim of an employee with end-stage
kidney failure, who was denied accommodation for dialysis treatment,
becomes a contest over whether 'eliminating waste from the body' is a
major life activity."' The net result was that by construing the term
"disability" so narrowly, the ADA became unable to provide mean-
ingful protection to individuals with disabilities, essentially erasing the
ADA's employment-related discrimination provisions."0
The ADAAA was a legislative response to almost two decades of
judicial narrowing," as it specifically abrogates several Supreme
Court rulings. 2 The ADAAA is expected to increase the number of
6. Id. at 995.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing Hayes v. Phila. Water Dep't, No. 03-6013, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41852, at
*31-32 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2005) (granting summary judgment for an employer where employer
did not know of the plaintiff's specific disorder)).
9. Id. (citing Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
kidney failure to be disabling because eliminating waste from one's body is a major life
activity)).
10. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 Wm. & MARY L.
Rev. 1, 6-7 (2007) ("Similarly, the Court has undermined the ADA's anti-subordination ap-
proach by construing the term "disability" so narrowly that the statute is unable to provide
meaningful protection to individuals with disabilities who face employment-related discrimina-
tion. Under the guise of the statutory tool of "plain meaning," the Court has transformed Con-
gress's first finding-that it intends to cover at least 43 million Americans2l-to mean that
Congress intends to cover no more than 43 million Americans. In fact, the approach chosen by
the Court only results in about 13.5 million Americans receiving statutory coverage, with those
individuals typically being so disabled that they are not qualified to work even with reasonable
accommodations. This narrow interpretation, which contradicts the plain statutory language of
the ADA, essentially erases the statute's employment discrimination provisions.") (footnotes
omitted).
11. See infra Part III.E.
12. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3553 (rejecting the requirement
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its
companion cases that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be
determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures); Id. at § 2(b)(3)
(rejecting the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Id. at § 2(b)(4) (rejecting the standards enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the
terms "substantially" and "major" in the definition of disability under the ADA "need to be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," and that to be
substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA "an individual must have
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
3
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people covered under the statute, and move cases past the threshold
issue of coverage to the more substantive issues of discrimination."
Some commentators argue that there are already indications that the
ADAAA is having the desired impact as Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) chargesl 4 and lawsuits commenced in
federal district court' 5 have risen markedly since the ADAAA be-
central importance to most people's daily lives); Id. at § 2(b)(5) (conveying congressional intent
that the standard created by the Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially limits", and applied by lower
courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to
obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary
object of attention in cases brought under the Al)A should be whether entities covered under
the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an
individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis).
13. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: As-
sessing the ADA Amendment Acts of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. Rj'v. CoiioouY 217, 228 (2008) http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44/. ("By amending the ADA's definition
of disability, Congress has assured that more individuals will qualify as having disabilities. As a
result, more cases in the future will turn on the question of whether the plaintiff's requested
accommodation was reasonable.").
14. Memorandum from Jeffrey Norris on the 2010 ADA Enforcement Data impacts of the
ADA Amendments Act in expanding coverage to the Equal Employment Discrimination Advi-
sory Council (Feb. 18, 2011) available at http://www.eeac.org/web/memos/memo-detail.asp?ID=
4010 ("From an analysis of recently released detailed ADA enforcement data provided by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and covering Fiscal Year 2010 (October
1, 2009 - September 30, 2010), it seems pretty clear that enactment of the ADAAA has accom-
plished the goal of significantly expanding ADA protection for individuals claiming workplace
discrimination on the basis of disability. Indeed, ADA charges filed with the EEOC increased
17.3% last year, the highest percentage increase out of all discrimination charge categories
tracked by the agency.") (on file with author). See also Shanti Atkins, Retaliation and Race Top
Just-Released EEOC Charge Statistics, ELT (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.elt.com/blog/archive/
2011/01/11/retaliation-and-race-top-just-released-eeoc-charge-statistics/ ("This increase has been
fueled by the down economy, increased enforcement efforts by the Obama Administration and
employee-friendly revisions to EEO laws (such as the Americans With Disabilities Act Amend-
ment Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which makes it much easier to assert viable claims of disability
discrimination") (emphasis added). See also ADA Charge Data by Impairment/Bases - Re-
ceipts FY 1997 - FY 2010, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-receipts.
cfm.
15. Memorandum from Jeffrey Norris on Employment Discrimination Lawsuits filed in
Federal Court Up 5.5% in 2010; FLSA Cases Up 12.4% to the Equal Employment Advisory
Council (Mar. 18, 2011) available at http://www.eeac.org/web/memos/memodetail.asp?lD=4034
("[T]he A[dministrive] O[ffices of the United States Courts] began breaking out ADA lawsuits
as part of the employment discrimination category in F[iscal] Y[ear] 2005. . . The 1,522 ADA
Discrimination lawsuits filed in FY 2010 jumped 27% as compared to FY 2009, and have nearly
tripled since 2005.") (on file with author). See also Employers Beware: ADA Claims On The
Rise Now And Into The Foreseeable Future, Hunton & Williams (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.
huntonlaborblog.com/2010/07/articles/ada-title-iii-and-state-disabl/employers-beware-ada-
claims-on-the-rise-now-and-into-the-foreseeable-future/ ("As was predicted following the pas-
sage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which went into effect in January 2009,
there has been a subsequent surge in the filing of lawsuits under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). Lawsuits brought under the ADA now comprise the highest percentage of claims
filed by former employees.") See also Art Gutman, EEOC Files Lawsuits Against Five Compa-
nies, OFCCP Blog Spot (Sept. 20, 2011), http://ofccp.blogspot.com/2011/09/eeoc-files-ada-law-
suits-against-five.htmi.
4
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came effective on January 1, 2009.16 Others such as the EEOC disa-
gree and view the increased activity as more likely related to a higher
incidence of termination of individuals with disabilities during the re-
cent economic downturns." Nonetheless, the efficacy of the ADAAA
is uncertain until new cases are decided, or there is equalization of
employment rates between people with disabilities and those without
disabilities."'
So where does this leave people with disabilities who experienced
discrimination after the ADA first became effective in 1990, but
before the effective date of the ADAAA nearly two decades later in
2009? Since the ADAAA specifically overturned Supreme Court
precedents misinterpreting the ADA," should it be given some form
of retroactive effect? Although not all circuits have ruled on the ques-
tion of retroactivity for the ADAAA, those that have addressed the
matter have held that the ADAAA is not retroactive.2 0
16. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559 ("This Act and the amendments
made by this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2009.").
17. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16878, 16995-96 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03-25/pdf/2011-6056. ("Nev-
ertheless, we note that although charge data indicate an increase in ADA charges over the pe-
riod of time since the Amendments Act became effective, this increase may be attributable to
factors unrelated to the change in the ADA definition of disability. For example, government
research has found a higher incidence of termination of individuals with disabilities than those
without disabilities during economic downturns. Kaye, H. Steven, 'The Impact of the 2007-09
Recession on Workers with Disabilities,' Monthly Labor Review Online (U.S. Dept. of Labor
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Oct. 2010, Vol. 133, No. 10), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/10/art
2exc.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). We also note that ADA charges were steadily rising over a
period of years even prior to enactment of the ADA Amendments Act. To the extent that fac-
tors other than the Amendments Act explain or partially explain the increase in ADA charges
since the Act took effect, the increase in charges would not be attributable to the Amendments
Act or the final regulations.").
18. See infra part III.A for a discussion of the disparity in employment rates for people with
disabilities as compared to those without disabilities.
19. See also cases cited in note 12 and accompanying text.
20. Mckivitz v. Township of Stowe, No. 08-1247, 769 F. Supp. 2d 803, 836 n.15 (W.D. Pa.,
2010) ("The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became effective on January 1, 2009, broad-
ened the category of individuals entitled to statutory protection under the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act. Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 3-8; 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-3559 (2008). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not determined whether the changes made by the
ADA Amendments Act should be applied retroactively. Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495,
501, n. 5 (3d Cir.2010). Several other federal appellate courts have concluded that the ADA
Amendments Act should not be given retroactive effect. Becerril v. Pima County Assessor's
Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.2009); Thornton v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 587 F.3d 27,
35, n. 3 (1st Cir.2009); Frederickson v. United Parcel Service Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521, n. 1 (7th
Cir.2009); Lytes v. DC Water & Sewer Authority, 572 F.3d 936,942 (D.C.Cir.2009); Millholland v.
Sumner County Board of Education, 569 F.3d 562, 565 (6th Cir.2009); EEOC v. Agro Distribu-
tion LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469, n. 8 (5th Cir.2009). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the Plain-
tiffs' claims pursuant to the standards that were applicable as of February 21, 2008, when the
Board issued its decision denying the Plaintiffs' implicit request for a variance.").
5
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One individual with a disability that experienced discrimination be-
tween the enactment of ADA and ADAAA is John Shepherd. He
worked for AutoZone from 1996 to 2004, most recently as a parts
sales manager.2 1 In this role, his duties included "working closely with
customers and engaging in 'manual tasks' such as routine cleaning and
maintenance of the store, stocking shelves, and moving merchan-
dise."22 The daily tasks were assigned to employees randomly by a
computer program, though the store manager maintained discretion
to reassign tasks.23 Shepherd suffered from a back condition that
would cause severe debilitating pain when he performed tasks that
required twisting, which limited his ability to complete certain assign-
ments on the job.24 Shepherd's impairment led to him taking a series
of medical leaves from 2001 to 2003, returning to work several times
with medical restrictions related to mopping or buffing the floors.25 In
2004, Shepherd's doctor authorized his return to work from a medical
leave with increased medical restrictions, including "a lift limit of ten
to nineteen pounds, a limitation on time spent standing, and a prohibi-
tion on upper body twisting."26 AutoZone did not allow Shepherd to
return to work with these restrictions, instead placing him on involun-
tary medical leave.27 In 2005, AutoZone terminated Shepherd's em-
ployment pursuant to AutoZone's long-term disability policy after
keeping him on medical leave involuntarily for more than a year.28
In 2007, the EEOC filed charges under the ADA on behalf of John
Shepherd against AutoZone for allegedly discriminatory acts that oc-
curred before Congress passed and President Bush signed the 2008
amendments. 29 "In its motion for summary judgment, AutoZone ar-
gued that Shepherd was not a 'qualified individual with a disability'
from March 2003 through September 12, 2003."so Though AutoZone
acknowledged that Shepherd suffered from an impairment throughout
the relevant time, it contended that Shepherd's impairment did not
21. EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 636-38.
26. Id. at 638.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 636.
29. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., No. 07-CV-01154,
2007 WL 3359188 (C.D. Ill. June 13, 2007). ("This is an action under Titles I and V of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., to correct unlawful
employment practices on the bases of disability and retaliation and failure to provide reasonable
accommodations, and to provide appropriate relief to John P. Shepherd III ("Shepherd"), a
qualified individual with a disability, back and neck impairments, who was adversely affected by
such practices.").
30. AutoZone, 630 F.3d at 639.
[Vol. 34:1
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constitute a "disability" as defined by the ADA. 3 The district court
granted summary judgment for AutoZone on this claim, "finding that
the EEOC had not shown that Shepherd had a disability within the
meaning of the ADA as is required to demonstrate a failure to accom-
modate."3 2 The district court found that "Shepherd was not substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of caring for himself prior to
September 2003 and, as a result, could not be considered disabled
under the ADA.""
Although both parties acknowledged that Shepherd had an impair-
ment and received disability benefits from the Social Security Admin-
istration,34 he could not pass the threshold for being disabled under
the ADA." Shepherd was caught in what some commentators have
coined as the "Goldilocks dilemma," which is described by Bradley A.
Areheart as:
By having to fit into a very narrow construction of disability, claimants
are often found either "too disabled" or "not disabled enough" to
qualify for the protections of the ADA. Very few are "disabled just
right." Restrictive interpretations of the ADA have thus engendered a
situation in which many cases are decided solely by looking at the
characteristics of the plaintiff. The definition of disability may thus
create the absurd result of a person being disabled enough to be fired
from a job, but not disabled enough to challenge the firing. 36
The EEOC, unsatisfied with the result, filed a timely appeal to the
Seventh Circuit.37
Since the ADAAA was enacted to put an end to the "Goldilocks
Dilemma" by broadening the definition of persons with a disability,
it would be very beneficial to the EEOC's case if the ADAAA were
31. Id.
32. Id. at 637.
33. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
34. EEOC v. AutoZone Inc., No. 07-1154, 2009 WL 464574, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2009).
(The "EEOC's interest in pursuing perpetrators of discrimination is much broader than simply
obtaining relief for the victim of that discrimination.") Shepherd himself is not a party to the
suit; it is being brought by the EEOC. See also Press Release, EEOC, Disabled Person's Appli-
cation for Social Security Benefits No Bar to EEOC Suit, Judge Rules (Feb. 23, 2009) available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-23-09a.cmf (He applied for and received disa-
bility benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA).
35. Autozone, 630 F.3d at 645. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801
(1999) (The purposes and definitions of a person with a disability are different under the Social
Security Disability and Insurance (SSDI) program and the ADA.) (holding that an ADA plain-
tiff is not judicially estopped from the apparent contradiction that arises out of an earlier SSDI
total disability claim about her ability to perform the job with reasonable accommodation, but
rather must proffer a sufficient explanation).
36. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right": The Entrenchment of the Medi-
cal Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 209 (2008) (footnotes
omitted).
37. AutoZone, 630 F.3d at 636.
38. See also cases and colloquy in notes 12-13, and accompanying text.
7
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retroactive. A three judge panel in the Seventh Circuit had previously
ruled that the ADAAA is not retroactive in Fredricksen v. United Par-
cel Service. 9 Judge Hamilton, writing for a different three judge
panel, took a novel approach in EEOC v. AutoZone to find that Shep-
herd is a person with a disability. Although he explicitly states that
the ADAAA cannot be applied in EEOC v. AutoZone, he does utilize
the legislative history of the ADAAA to breathe new life into the orig-
inal ADA.
Judge Hamilton's approach was to first acknowledge Seventh Cir-
cuit precedent in a footnote by stating:
After this case was filed, Congress made significant changes to the
ADA that took effect January 1, 2009. See ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. Because Congress did not
express its intent for these changes to apply retroactively, see Fredrick-
sen, 581 F.3d at 521, we cite, quote, and apply the ADA as it stood
before the amendments. 40
However, later in the opinion he cites the legislative history from the
2008 ADAAA to give meaning to the term "major life activity" in the
original 1990 ADA by stating:
Our application [of the ADA to Shepherd's "major life activity" of
self care] is consistent with the purpose of the ADA to "provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate" to combat disability dis-
crimination. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327, 329; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008
§ 1(b), 122 Stat. at 3554 (elaborating on a broad scope of protection
intended by Congress to be available under the original Act); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d
450 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the ADA was meant to
serve a remedial purpose). The specific inclusion of "caring for one-
self" in the 2008 Amendments' list of major life activities further sup-
ports this interpretation. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a),
122 Stat. at 3555, amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102.41
There are three key items to note in this passage. First, Judge Ham-
ilton uses the explanatory parenthetical to establish that Congress in
enacting the ADAAA was "elaborating on a broad scope of protec-
tion intended by Congress to be available under the original Act."4 2
Second, he states that the "specific inclusion of 'caring for oneself' in
the 2008 Amendments' list of major life activities further supports this
39. Fredricksen v. United Parcel Service, Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Signifi-
cant changes to the ADA took effect on January 1, 2009, after this appeal was filed. Congress
did not express its intent for these changes to apply retroactively, and so we look to the law in
place prior to the amendments.") (citations omitted).
40. AutoZone, 630 F.3d at 639 n.2.
41. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 34:1
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interpretation."4 3 These two statements utilize the legislative history
from 2008 to help clarify congressional intent from nearly two decades
earlier. Finally, he cites the dissent in Sutton v. United Air Lines4 4 to
support his conclusion. Sutton is one of the cases that was still good
law in 2003 when Shepherd was fired from his job and in 2007 when
the EEOC filed a case on his behalf.4 5 The majority's holding in Sut-
ton was expressly abrogated by the 2008 ADAAA. 4 6 By ignoring the
majority opinion in Sutton and utilizing legislative history of the
ADAAA in EEOC v. AutoZone, Judge Hamilton effectively gives a
measure of retroactive effect to ADAAA.
On a second matter in the case concerning the meaning of the
phrase "substantially limited," Judge Hamilton performs a similar
maneuver:
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 superseded Williams by expressly
rejecting the Court's narrow interpretation of the terms "substantially
limits" and "major life activity" in favor of a broader interpretation.
Part of Congress's purpose in enacting the Amendments was to make
clear its intent that the determination of whether an individual has a
disability under the ADA "should not demand extensive analysis."
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554. Of partic-
ular note, Congress stated that the term "substantially limits" should be
interpreted broadly to provide wide coverage. See id. § 2(a)(1), 122
Stat. at 3553. As we have said, because there is no indication that Con-
gress intended the ADA Amendments to have retroactive effect, we
rely on the ADA as it existed at the time of the relevant events, and
on the case law, including Williams, interpreting that version of the
statute and implementing regulations. We reach our conclusion that
the EEOC has raised a genuine question for trial even without the
clarifying language in the Amendments, which only underscores our
conclusion.47
In citing, but not following Williams, Judge Hamilton once again dis-
cusses a case that was "good law" at the time of the events and filing
of AutoZone, but later abrogated by the ADAAA. He once again
utilizes the legislative history of the ADAAA to determine the origi-
nal meaning of the ADA by remarking that "the clarifying language in
the Amendments . .. only underscores our conclusion.""
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495.
45. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 ("(4) the holdings of the Supreme
Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have
narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating
protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect").
46. See also cases cited in note 12, and accompanying text.
47. AutoZone, 630 F.3d at 641 n.3. (emphasis added).
48. Id.
9
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Although Judge Hamilton ostensibly used pre-ADAAA law to de-
cide AutoZone, he liberally referenced the ADAAA and its legislative
history in reaching his conclusions. The remainder of this article ana-
lyzes the legal and policy implications of this approach.
B. Retroactivity in the Law Generally
Justice Rutledge wrote in 1946 that "[r]etroactivity, even where per-
missible, is not favored, except upon the clearest mandate."4 9 One of
the earliest expressions of this principal of statutory construction by
the Supreme Court in civil cases was in the 1806 case of U.S. v. Heth
where Justice Johnson wrote that "[u]nless, therefore, the words are
too imperious to admit of a different construction, it will be gratifying
to the court to be able to vindicate the justice of the government, by
restricting the words of the law to a future operation.""o At the same
time, the court in Heth refused to apply the ex post facto clause of the
U.S. Constitution to civil cases, reserving it for application to criminal
cases." This presumption against the retroactivity of civil laws has
been repeated more recently by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Ge-
orgetown University Hospital when Justice Kennedy wrote
"[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law."52 "Thus, congressional en-
actments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retro-
active effect unless their language requires this result."" Justice
Scalia, in a concurring opinion, wrote in part to describe the difference
between "primary" retroactivity (altering the past legal consequences
of past actions), from "secondary" retroactivity in a new rule that has
exclusively future effect (taxation on future trust income), but can un-
questionably affect past transactions (rendering the previously estab-
lished trusts less desirable in the future).5 4 The approach taken in
AutoZone, although not technically a retroactive application of the
law, resulted in the ADAAA having primary retroactive effect.
49. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944) (reviewing the retrospec-
tive tax implications of the Bankruptcy Act).
50. U.S. v. Heth, 7 U.S. 399, 408 (1806).
51. Id. at 399 ("It cannot be deemed an unconstitutional act as being ex post facto, because
the prohibition of the constitution extends to criminal cases only.") (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386 (1798)).
52. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (holding statutory grants
of rulemaking authority will not be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroac-
tive rules unless that power is conveyed by express terms) (citations omitted above) (collecting
cases including Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160, 84 S.Ct. 615, 621-622, 11 L.Ed.2d 576
(1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 164, 65 S.Ct. 172, 185, 89 L.Ed.
139 (1944); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439, 55 S.Ct. 440, 441-442, 79 L.Ed. 977 (1935);
United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-163, 48 S.Ct. 236, 237, 72 L.Ed. 509
(1928)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 218 (Scalia, A., concurring).
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Temporally, there are four types of retroactivity that can arise when
a new common law rule is established or statute enacted." The New
Jersey Supreme Court summarizes them succinctly:
[11 The Court may decide to apply the new rule purely prospectively,
applying it only to cases in which the operative facts arise after the
new rule has been announced. [2] Alternatively, the Court may apply
the new rule in future cases and in the case in which the rule is an-
nounced, but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached
final judgment at the time the new rule is set forth. [3] A third option
is to give the new rule "pipeline retroactivity," rendering it applicable
in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any
cases still on direct appeal. [4] Finally, the Court may give the new
rule complete retroactive effect, applying it to all cases, including
those in which final judgments have been entered and all other ave-
nues of appeal have been exhausted.56
The approach in AutoZone most closely resembles the third type -
pipeline retroactivity.
The Supreme Court has been receptive to pipeline retroactivity in
civil cases such as Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm." Congress had legisla-
tively overturned a decisions defining the statute of limitations period
for certain fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission." Although the Plaut Court held that separation
of powers principals prevented Congress from resurrecting a federal
civil suit in which a final judgment had been entered,6 0 the Plaut Court
was receptive to Congress changing the law for pending cases. 6 1 JUS-
tice Scalia, writing for the majority, expressed the Courts position on
pipeline retroactivity:
It is true, as petitioners contend, that Congress can always revise the
judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes
clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in
reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law
was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly. 62
55. State v. Knight, 678 A.2d 642 (N.J. 1996) (citations omitted) (articulating and applying a
three factor test for determining when rules of criminal procedure should be applied
retroactively).
56. Id. at 650-51.
57. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
58. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
59. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213.
60. Id. at 240 ("We know of no previous instance in which Congress has enacted retroactive
legislation requiring an Article Ill court to set aside a final judgment, and for good reason. The
Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial powers denies it the authority to do so. Sec-
tion 27A(b) is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judg-
ments entered before its enactment.").
61. Id. at 227.
62. Id. (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801) and Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); see infra Part II.C for a discussion of Landgraf.
11
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C. The EEOC's Position on the Retroactivity of the ADAAA
Associate Legal Counsel for the EEOC, Peggy Mastroianni,6
speaking on a symposium panel shortly after the enactment of the
ADAAA, began her remarks by stating that "the ADA Amendments
Act does not - in our view - change the ADA so much as it restores its
original intent."6 4 While acknowledging the restorative effect of the
ADAAA on the ADA, she concluded her remarks by eschewing pipe-
line retroactivity for the ADAAA by stating:
The last point I want to make is retroactivity. When great civil rights
laws are passed, plaintiffs want them to apply retroactively. This hap-
pened under the last great civil rights law, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Two cases on retroactivity went all the way to the Supreme Court -
Landgraf and Rivers. They give us a framework for looking at retroac-
tivity under the ADA Amendments Act and the message they tell us
isn't a very hopeful one. It is that, first of all, there's a presumption
against retroactivity unless there is clear congressional intent to sup-
port it. And of course, with the ADA Amendments Act, you have
Congress making it effective three months after it is enacted, as op-
posed to, for example, the Lily Ledbetter law which is clearly retroac-
tive. Congress is saying in the law that it's effective the day before the
bad Ledbetter court decision.6 5
However, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is
clearly distinguishable from the ADAAA. Also, the situation in the
two cases cited by Mastroianni, Landgraf6 and Rivers,6 7 are easily dis-
tinguishable from the situation in AutoZone, and that of many other
individuals with disabilities facing the "Goldilocks Dilemma."
As Justice Stephens articulated in Landgraf, the issue of absence of
retroactivity was clearly a factor in passing the Civil Rights Act of
1991:
In 1990, a comprehensive civil rights bill passed both Houses of
Congress. Although similar to the 1991 Act in many other respects,
the 1990 bill differed in that it contained language expressly calling for
application of many of its provisions, including the section providing
for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, to
63. During the course of writing this paper, Peggy Mastroianni was promoted to the posi-
tion of Legal Counsel at the EEOC. In an internal memorandum on March 30, 2011, EEOC
Chair Jacqueline Barrien announced the appointment, noting Mastroianni's distinguished career
of over twenty years with the EEOC. Memorandum from Jacqueline A. Berrin, EEOC Chair,
on the appointment of EEOC Legal Council to all EEOC Employees (Mar. 30, 2011) (on file
with author).
64. Symposium, Assisting Law Students with Disabilities in the 21st Century: A New Hori-
zon?: What the ADA Amendments and Higher Education Acts Mean for Law Schools, 18 AM. U.
J. GENoN SOC. Po.'y & L. 13, 16 (2009).
65. Id. at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
66. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
67. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
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cases arising before its (expected) enactment. The President vetoed
the 1990 legislation, however, citing the bill's "unfair retroactivity
rules" as one reason for his disapproval. Congress narrowly failed to
override the veto. (66 to 34 Senate vote in favor of override).
The absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot realisti-
cally be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity
issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of the compromises that made it
possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to include the
kind of explicit retroactivity command found in the 1990 bill. 68
The ADAAA did not take a similar path to enactment. Although the
ADAAA was preceded by the failed attempt at reform in the ADA
Restoration Act in 2006 and 2007, there was not an analogous debate
and clear abandonment of retroactive attempt.6 9
Like the ADAAA, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was also in response
to Supreme Court decisions which Congress wished to expressly over-
turn.70 However, "[a] number of important provisions in the Act ...
were not responses to Supreme Court decisions. In Landgraf, the
provision at issue was not amongst those that were in direct response
to any Supreme Court decisions.72  This is in contrast to AutoZone
where the issues were directly related to two Supreme Court cases,
which Congress expressly wished to abrogate." Therefore, the deci-
sion in Landgraf should not be used in an ADA case interpreting the
definition of a person with a disability such as AutoZone. When a
statute restores rather than expands the law, the legislative history of
the new statute should be considered relevant to determining the con-
gressional intent when it enacted the original legislation.
In her remarks, Mastroianni does not foreclose all retroactive ef-
fects of the ADAAA, describing situations where a reasonable accom-
68. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 255-56.
69. See infra Parts Ill.D and Ill.E.
70. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 250-51 ("The 1991 Act is in large part a response to a series of
decisions of this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964. Section 3(4), 105 Stat.
1071, note following 42 U.S.C. § 1981, expressly identifies as one of the Act's purposes 'to re-
spond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.' That section, as
well as a specific finding in § 2(2), identifies Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 1989), as a decision that gave rise to special concerns. Section
105 of the Act, entitled "Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases," is a direct response to
Wards Cove. Other sections of the Act were obviously drafted with 'recent decisions of the
Supreme Court in mind."').
71. Id. at 251.
72. Id. at 252 ("Among the provisions that did not directly respond to any Supreme Court
decision is the one at issue in this case, § 102.").
73. See supra Part L.A (discussing the use of the Sutton and Williams in deciding AutoZone);
See also cases cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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modation requested before the enactment of the act may be renewed,
and therefore covered under the ADAAA.7 4 She stated:
Also, in Rivers the Court said just because a statute is restorative,
that doesn't automatically make it retroactive. But - and there are a
lot of buts here - employers should not take it easy on this issue be-
cause even if a claim was filed before the effective date of the ADA
Amendments Act, before January 1st of this year, if it involved, for
example, reasonable accommodation and the person renews the re-
quest for accommodation, it is the ADA Amendments Act standard
that controls.
And also, we have one case - Jenkins v. National Board of Medical
Examiners - that involved someone who was seeking a reasonable ac-
commodation to take the medical boards and there's a very good Sixth
Circuit decision in which the court notes that even though the suit was
brought before January 1st, 2009, the actual exam is not taking place
until spring 2010 and therefore the ADA Amendments Act controls.7 5
The Court in Jenkins aptly noted that "Landgraf does not stand for
the principle that new laws should never apply to cases pending on
appeal."" It reasoned that "[b]ecause this case involves prospective
relief and was pending when the amendments became effective, the
ADA must be applied as amended."7 In remanding the case, the
Sixth District Court of Appeals noted that the district court should not
rely on the Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
decision, which was repudiated by Congress in the ADAAA.7 1 In tak-
ing this approach, the court implemented a limited form of pipeline
retroactivity. Since Jenkins was not controlling precedent in
AutoZone because it was an unpublished decision in a different cir-
cuit, and it was limited to future requests for reasonable accommoda-
tions, it would not have helped the EEOC with the damages sought on
behalf of John Sheppard in AutoZone.
74. See generally supra note 64, at 21.
75. Id. (footnote omitted) (referring to Jenkins v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 2009 WL
331638 (6th Cir. 2009)).
76. Jenkins v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 2009 WL 331638, at *2 (6th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id. at *3 ("Without the benefit of these amendments, the district court relied on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Toyota, which was controlling precedent at the time the district
rendered its decision. The district court concluded that Jenkins would only qualify for protection
under the ADA if his disability 'precluded' him from performing reading tasks that were 'central
to most people's daily lives.' Jenkins, 2008 WL 410237, at *3.
In holding that Jenkins was not substantially limited in his ability to read, the district court relied
on the very language from Toyota that Congress repudiated in the ADA Amendments Act.
Compare id. at *4-5, with ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008).The change in the law has therefore undermined the district court's hold-
ing, and the resolution of this case will require the district court to make a fresh application of
the law to the facts in light of the amendments to the ADA."); see also cases cited supra note 12
and accompanying text.
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The EEOC's recently promulgated ADAAA regulations continue
to take the position that application of the ADAAA is prospective by
stating "[t]he ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the Amendments Act)
was signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 25,
2008, with a statutory effective date of January 1, 2009."79 The inter-
pretive regulations themselves have a prospective application, stating
"[t]hese final regulations will become effective on May 24, 2011," 60
days after their publication in the Federal Register.s0 While courts are
often expected to grant deference to EEOC interpretations under the
familiar Chevron doctrine," there is no express reasoning in the newly
released regulations explaining how the agency arrived at this conclu-
sion to make the new regulations effective only in the future.8 2
Shortly after promulgating the ADAAA regulations, the EEOC
also posted a number of "Questions and Answers" on their web site.8 3
Of the thirty-three questions posed and answered, the one about ret-
roactivity is the first one listed. 84 Specifically, they state:
1. Does the ADAAA apply to discriminatory acts that occurred prior
to January 1, 2009?
79. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, supra note 17.http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/03/25/
2011-6056/regulations-to-implement-the-equal-employment-provisions-of-the-americans-with-
disabilities-act-as.
80. Id.
81. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (es-
tablishing the rule that when an agency is interpreting a statute, and it is ambiguous or silent on
the precise issue, courts must accept the agency's interpretation as long as it is a reasonable one)
("When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who
have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones." Id. at *866); U.S. v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding when Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill,
any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capri-
cious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute).
82. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (although the EEOC inter-
pretation of retroactive effect may not warrant Chevron deference, it may at least be granted
Skidmore deference) (establishing a four part test for determining when deference should be
granted to an agency) ("We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Admin-
istrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may prop-
erly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon [1]
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, [2] the validity of its reasoning, [3] its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and [4] all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.") Id. at 140.
83. See generally EEOC, Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, http://www.eeoc.govIlaws/regulations/ada-qa-final-rule.cfm (last vis-
ited April 9, 2011).
84. Id.
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No. The ADAAA does not apply retroactively. For example, the
ADAAA would not apply to a situation in which an employer, union,
or employment agency allegedly failed to hire, terminated, or denied a
reasonable accommodation to someone with a disability in December
2008, even if the person did not file a charge with the EEOC until
after January 1, 2009. The original ADA definition of disability would
be applied to such a charge. However, the ADAAA would apply to
denials of reasonable accommodation where a request was made (or
an earlier request was renewed) or to other alleged discriminatory acts
that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.85
These "Questions and Answers" do not have the force of law." They
do however clearly reflect the EEOC's opinion that although the
ADAAA does not have pipeline retroactive effect, it would apply in
situations such as Jenkins where the accommodation requested would
occur in the future, or in situations where there was a renewed request
for accommodations. However, this "Question and Answer" is not
necessarily inconsistent with the result in AutoZone. Following Judge
Hamilton's approach "the original ADA definition to be applied to
such a charge" is the more expansive definition envisioned by the au-
thors of the ADA, and subsequently clarified in the ADAAA; not the
definition wrongfully created by the Supreme Court which was ex-
pressly overruled by the ADAAA."
II. CONGRESS HAS A LONG HISTORY OF OVERTURNING SUPREME
COURT CIVIL RIGHTS DECISIONS, THEREBY
LIMITING THEIR SCOPE
A. Disrespecting Congress - The Supreme Court's Interpretation
of Civil Rights Laws
In an empirical study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court
decisions, Professor Eskridge reported that from 1967 to 1990, civil
rights was one of the top categories, trailing only the category of crim-
85. Id.
86. These types of interpretive materials that do not go through notice and comment rule
making are entitled only to so-called Skidmore deference as described in What the ADA Amend-
ments and Higher Education Acts mean for Law Schools , supra note 64. Justice Scalia recently
pointed out that the term "Skidmore deference" may be an oxymoron:
In my view this doctrine (if it can be called that) is incoherent, both linguistically and practi-
cally. To defer is to subordinate one's own judgment to another's. If one has been persuaded
by another, so that one's judgment accords with the other's, there is no room for deferral -
only for agreement. Speaking of "Skidmore deference" to a persuasive agency position does
nothing but confuse.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1349, n. 6 (2011) (Scalia, A.,
dissenting).
87. See cases cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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inal law, tying for second with antitrust law.88 With the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overrode twelve Supreme Court
decisions, civil rights moved up to the top category for period 1967 to
1992.89 Professor Colker expounds on the Supreme Courts approach
prior to the ADAAA which led to this result.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the
scope of protection provided under federal civil rights law while also
increasingly disavowing the usefulness of legislative history to inter-
pret these statutes. Left only with the legislative text, the Court has
imposed an interpretation on these statutes that can only be described
as 'dissing Congress,' because it flouts both the statutory language and
congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history. Hence, the
civil rights community has had to persuade Congress to enact key civil
rights legislation twice-first as a pathbreaking statute, and then again
as a "restoration act" -to attain the intended scope of statutory
protection. 90
Although she wrote this passage before the enactment of the
ADAAA, the ADA eventually followed the same pattern.9' The re-
maining sections of this part will describe the progression of increas-
ing levels of retroactivity enacted in several congressional overrides of
civil rights decisions.
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
"The Supreme Court's repeated insistence on interpreting the scope
of civil rights laws narrowly began in 1976, when it concluded that the
prohibition against 'sex discrimination' found in Title VII did not in-
clude a prohibition against pregnancy-based discrimination in General
Electric v. Gilbert."9 2 In Gilbert, "the Court held that an employer's
disability plan that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities did not vio-
late Title VII. However, Congress reacted relatively swiftly to this de-
cision and on October 31, 1978, Title VII was amended through the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act [PDA] of 1978."93 "The PDA's lan-
guage and legislative history indicate that the amendment was de-
signed to overrule Gilbert and to require employers who provide
disability benefits to their employees to extend such benefits to wo-
88. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YAi L.J. 331, 344-45 (1991).
89. Id. at 345 n.31.
90. Colker, supra note 10, at 4 (alteration in original).
91. Id. at 6-7; see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); see Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
92. Id. at 15; See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
93. Paula G. Ardelean, Mitchell C. Baker, Brian D. Hall, Wynter Allen, Thomas F. Hurka,
Alison T. Vance, and David J. Carr, The Development of Employment Rights and Responsibili-
ties from 1985 to 2010, 25 ABA J. LAn. & Emr. L. 449 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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men who are unable to work because of pregnancy-related
conditions."9 4
The text of the PDA, by expressly stating it becomes effective on
the date of enactment and by providing provisions for the application
to employee benefits programs to be phased-in, makes it clear that its
application is prospective." The legislative history also expresses this
intent.9 6 As recently as 2009, the Supreme Court reinforced the no-
tion of prospective application in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen." In
Hulteen, AT&T made adjustments to their pension plan when the
PDA became effective, but did not "make any retroactive adjustments
to the service credit calculations of women who had been subject to
the pre-PDA personnel policies.""' Therefore, the women received
less service credit for pregnancy leave taken prior to the effective date
94. Id. (footnotes omitted).
95. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat 2076.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 // 42 USC
2000e. / is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
'(k) The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and wo-
men affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in section 703(h) of this title // 42 USC 2000e-2. / shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise. . . .'
Sec. 2. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendment made by this Act // 42
USC 2000e. // shall be effective on the date of enactment.
(b) The provisions of the amendment made by the first section of this Act shall not apply
to any fringe benefit program or fund, or insurance program which is in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act until 180 days after enactment of this Act .
Sec. 3. Until the expiration of a period of one year from the date of enactment of this Act
// 42 USC 2000e // or, if there is an applicable collective-bargaining agreement in effect on
the date of enactment of this Act, until the termination of that agreement, no person who,
on the date of enactment of this Act is providing either by direct payment or by making
contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program, benefits in violation with this
Act shall, in order to come into compliance with this Act, reduce the benefits or the com-
pensation provided any employee on the date of enactment of this Act, either directly or by
failing to provide sufficient contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program:
Provided, That where the costs of such benefits on the date of enactment of this Act are
apportioned between employers and employees, the payments or contributions required to
comply with this Act may be made by employers and employees in the same proportion:
And provided further, That nothing in this section shall prevent the readjustment of benefits
or compensation for reasons unrelated to compliance with this Act.
96. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearing on S. 995 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Comm. on Human Res. 95th Cong. (1977) (statement of Orrin Hatch,
Senator of the United States) ("Senator HATCH. Well, I am concerned because I think that the
bill is drafted too broadly also. So I am sending a letter to the chairman and the ranking minority
member and asking them to consider some of the suggestions that I have made here. And some
that I am making, I think are quite important. And you might give me your ideas on them. One
of them is that I think this ought to be applied prospective and not retroactive. If we provide it
retroactively, it could dislocate and create many problems in America. Mr. LAZARI-sco. I would
agree.").
97. AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S.Ct. 1962 (2009).
98. Id. at 1967.
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of the PDA than they would have accrued on the same leave for disa-
bility, resulting in a lower pension benefits.99 Citing Landgraf for the
presumption against retroactivity without a clear expression of in-
tent,100 the court held that this form of discrimination was not illegal
because the PDA was not retroactive.o The court cited Rivers, and
also cited the overridden Gilbert decision approvingly in a footnote
stating that it is "to no avail to argue that the pregnancy leave cap was
unlawful before Gilbert and that the PDA returned the law to its prior
state.""0 2 It is clear that in their first attempt to override the Supreme
Court on a hyper-technical Title VII civil rights decision, Congress did
not intend to or inadvertently create any retroactive coverage for vic-
tims of pregnancy discrimination.
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
During the summer of 1989, the Supreme Court decided seven cases
interpreting civil rights statutes in ways that were restrictive to plain-
tiffs.103 "On February 7, 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was intro-
duced by Edward Kennedy in the Senate and Gus Hawkins in the
House."O 4 "Both houses of Congress responded to these decisions by
99. Id. (". . . a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and
public expectations. Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively consid-
ered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable
price to pay for the countervailing benefits.").
100. Id. at 1971.
101. Id. at 1973.
102. Id. at 1971 n.5. ("Although certain circuit courts had previously concluded that treating
pregnancy leave less favorably than other disability leave constituted sex discrimination under
Title VII, this Court in Gilbert clearly rejected that conclusion, 429 U.S. 125, at 147, 97 S. Ct. 401
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id., at 162, 97 S. Ct. 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting) or 429 U.S.
125, at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id., at 162, (Stevens, J., dissenting). Gilbert declared
the meaning and scope of sex discrimination under Title VII and held that previous views to the
contrary were wrong as a matter of law. And "[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authori-
tative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving
rise to that construction." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-313, 114 S. Ct.
1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994); see also id., at 313, n. 12, 114 S. Ct. 1510; see also id., at 313, n. 12.
It is therefore to no avail to argue that the pregnancy leave cap was unlawful before Gilbert and
that the PDA returned the law to its prior state.").
103. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the
Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 924 (1993) (cit-
ing Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance
v. AT&T, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). "In addition to
these cases, § 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1992), overruled a long line of
precedents going back to Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981). Lehman, and cases in its
wake, had held that there are no jury trials in Title VII cases. Id. at n.2.
104. Neal Devins, Regan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 No-rRE DAME L. REV. 955, 984
(1993) (citing 136 Cong. Rec. 1624 (1990) (text of S.2104 and accompanying remarks by Sen.
Kennedy); 136 Cong. Rec. 1550 (1990) (introduction of H.R. 4000 and accompanying remarks by
Rep. Hawkins)).
19
Melkey: Creating New Law or Restoring the Old - Retroactivity and the Ame
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2011
20 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1990, reversing at least five of these
Supreme Court employment discrimination cases.""os "In addition,
this proposed law explicitly provided for its retroactive application to
fact situations that occurred before the bill became law and to cases
then pending on appeal." 0 6 "However, it never became law because
President Bush vetoed it on October 22, 1990. The Senate failed to
override that veto by only one vote."'o7 In his veto message, the Pres-
105. Rotunda, supra note 103, at 924.
106. Id. (emphasis added); see 136 Cong. Rec. 29,605-06 (1990) (recording the Senate vote on
the final version of the bill (S. 2104)); 136 Cong. Rec. 30,136 (1990) (recording the House vote
on S. 2104). The language of S. 2104 appears in the Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
101-856, at 1-13 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 136 Cong. Rec. 28,789-93 (1990). Section 15 of
the act expressly indicated the retroactive intent by stating:
SEC. 15. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITION RULES.
(a) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by-
(1) section 4 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 5, 1989
[the date of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 21151;
(2) section 5 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after May 1,
1989[the date of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775];
(3) section 6 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 12,
1989 [the date of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S.Ct. 2180];
(4) section 7(a)(1), 7(a)(3), and 7(a)(4), 7(b), 8, 9, 10, and II shall apply to all proceed-
ings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act;
(5) section 7(a)(2) shall apply to all proceedings pending on or after June 12, 1989[the
date of Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261]; and
(6) section 12 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 15,
1989[the date of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363].
(b) TRANSITION RULES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Any orders entered by a court between the effective dates de-
scribed in subsection (a) and the date of enactment of this Act that are inconsistent
with the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or 12, shall be vacated if, not later
than 1 year after such date of enactment, a request for such relief is made.
(2) SECTION 6.-Any orders entered between June 12, 1989 and the date of enactment
of this Act, that permit a challenge to an employment practice that implements a liti-
gated or consent judgment or order and that is inconsistent with the amendment made
by section 6, shall be vacated if, not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of
this Act, a request for such relief is made. For the 1-year period beginning on the date
of enactment of this Act, an individual whose challenge to an employment practice that
implements a litigated or consent judgment or order is denied under the amendment
made by section 6, or whose order or relief obtained under such challenge is vacated
under such section, shall have the same right of intervention in the case in which the
challenged litigated or consent judgment or order was entered as that individual had on
June 12, 1989.
(3) FINAL JUDGMENTS.-Pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), any final judgment en-
tered prior to the date of the enactment of this Act as to which the rights of any of the
parties thereto have become fixed and vested, where the time for seeking further judi-
cial review of such judgment has otherwise expired pursuant to title 28 of the United
States Code, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, shall be vacated in whole or in part if justice requires pursuant to rule
60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other appropriate authority, and
consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process of law.
(c) PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS.-The period of limitations for the filing of a claim or
charge shall be tolled from the applicable effective date described in subsection (a) until the
date of enactment of this Act, on a showing that the claim or charge was not filed because of
a rule or decision altered by the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or 12.
Id.
107. Rotunda, supra note 103, at 924.
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ident devoted the bulk of his justification to concerns that it would
lead to quotas.108 President Bush also found the "unfair retroactivity
rules" unacceptable.' 0 9
On the first day of the next Congress, many members of the House
introduced House Resolution 1, the Civil Rights and Women's Equity
in Employment Act of 1991.' "This new bill added two 1991 Su-
preme Court decisions to the list of pro-employer decisions that the
new legislation would correct.""' "After much debate, Congress pro-
duced the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which President Bush signed on
November 21, 1991.",112 The 1991 version of the bill did not have the
retroactivity provisions."' As Justice Stevens pointed out in Lan-
dgraf, omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990 bill
cannot realistically be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the
retroactivity issue.11 4 He speculates that its omission is likely to have
been one of the compromises struck to gain sufficient support for en-
actment."' Civil rights advocates may have lost the battle on retroac-
tivity, but they "won the war" by overturning the Supreme Court
decisions which misinterpreted the statutes.
There was another item left out of the final version of the 1991 bill
that would have been useful to ADA plaintiffs such as Shepherd - a
canon of statutory construction that would broadly construe civil
108. Devins, supra note 104, at 988.
109. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 2 Pub.
Papers 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public-papers.
php?id=2345&year=1990&month=10 ("The bill also contains a number of provisions that will
create unnecessary and inappropriate incentives for litigation. These include unfair retroactivity
rules; attorneys fee provisions that will discourage settlements; unreasonable new statutes of
limitation; and a ["]rule of construction" that will make it extremely difficult to know how courts
can be expected to apply the law.").
110. Rotunda, supra note 103, at 926 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 14, 16 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 554-55).
1l. Rotunda, supra note 103, at 926 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991);
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)).
112. Rotunda, supra note 103, at 926.
113. Id. at 927.
114. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1994). ("The absence of comparable
language in the 1991 Act cannot realistically be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the
retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of the compromises that made it possible to
enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to include the kind of explicit retroactivity com-
mand found in the 1990 bill. The omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990
bill-which was by no means the only source of political controversy over that legislation-is not
dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the 1991
Act. The Legislature might, for example, have settled in 1991 on a less expansive form of retro-
activity that, unlike the 1990 bill, did not reach cases already finally decided. A decision to reach
only cases still pending might explain Congress' failure to provide in the 1991 Act, as it had in
1990, that certain sections would apply to proceedings pending on specific preenactment dates");
see also supra part I.C.
115. Id. at 256.
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rights statutes. As Professor Colker recounts before the passage of
the ADAAA:
Congress expressed its frustration with the Court's narrow interpre-
tations of the Civil Rights Acts by proposing a "rule of construction"
in the 1991 Act, which applied to disability nondiscrimination laws as
well as those laws that applied to race, color, nationality, origin, sex,
religion, and age. The proposed rule stated that "[a]ll federal laws
protecting the civil rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent
with the intent of such laws, and shall be broadly construed to effectu-
ate the purpose of such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide
effective remedies." This language was adopted by the House but,
without any explanation in the legislative history, was not in the final
version adopted by the Senate. Had the Court followed the civil rights
canon on its own volition, Congress would not currently be in the posi-
tion of having to restore the ADA to its original intentions.'' 6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also took the highly unusual step of spec-
ifying in the statute the portions of legislative history relevant to its
interpretation.'
D. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 - Express
Retroactivity
Congress most recently expressed dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court's mistaken interpretation of a civil rights statute when it en-
acted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.' " Lily Ledbetter was
a retiree from Goodyear Tire & Rubber Corporation alleging sex dis-
crimination in compensation." 9 She alleged that this was due to dis-
criminatory acts that had occurred years ago early in her career. 12 0
Since these events occurred long ago, the statue of limitations might
have been exhausted. Some circuits at the time accepted the
"paycheck accrual rule", which in effect reset the tolling of the statue
of limitations each time a new paycheck was issued.' 2 ' Ledbetter won
her case at the district court level,12 2 but the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the decision,123 and the Supreme Court af-
116. Colker, supra note 10, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
117. Id. at 18 n.64; see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 3(2), 105(b), 105 Stat.
1071, 1075.
118. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
119. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007).
120. Id. at 622 ("Ledbetter introduced evidence that during the course of her employment
several supervisors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex, that as a result of these
evaluations her pay was not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evaluated
fairly, and that these past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout
her employment. Toward the end of her time with Goodyear, she was being paid significantly
less than any of her male colleagues.").
121. See id. at 633-43.
122. Id. at 622.
123. Id. at 622-23.
[Vol. 34:1
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firmed. 1 24  Justice Alito, writing for the majority expressed the opin-
ion that "because a pay setting decision is a discrete act, it follows that
the period for filling an EEOC charge begins when the act occurs. "125
The court expressly rejected the paycheck accrual rule theory by dis-
tinguishing this case situation from Bazmore v. Friday.126 Justice Al-
ito went on to summarize the history of legislative compromise which
preceded the enactment of Title VII, describing how the EEOC filing
deadline protects employers from the burden of defending claims aris-
ing from employment decisions which had occurred long ago, and how
congress expressly chose to take a different approach than the equita-
ble doctrine of laches for these types of claims.12 7
Justice Ginsburg wrote a scathing dissent, choosing to read the en-
tire eight page slip opinion from the bench.128  Noting that "[t]his is
not the first time the Court has ordered a cramped interpretation of
Title VII incompatible with the statute's broad remedial purpose, "129
she concluded her opinion with an invitation to Congress.13 0  Refer-
ring to the Supreme Court decisions that led to the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,' she pronounced "[o]nce again, the ball is
in Congress' court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to correct this
Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII." 1 3 2
"Members of the 110th Congress promptly countered the Court's
decision with legislation designed to overturn Ledbetter, but oppo-
nents of the bill successfully forestalled the measure in the Senate."' 3
After the 2008 elections, members of the 111th Congress acted quickly
124. Id. at 621.
125. Id. at 621. The Court further explained that a "discriminatory act which is not made the
basis for a timely charge ... is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal
consequence." Id. at 625-26 (citing United Airlines Inc. V. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)).
126. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 390 (1986) (holding that service employees who were
originally segregated prior to the enactment of Title VII into a "white branch" and "negro
branch", with the later receiving less pay was not excused after the employees became covered
by Title VII).
127. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 629-32.
128. Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on Court, N.Y. TIME S,
May 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/31scotus.html; Kay Steiger, Equal
Pay Reality Check: Now that the Supreme Court has gutted pay discrimination law, it's up to
Congress to ensure that employers don't get away with paying women or minorities less money for
the same work., AM. PROSPEcr, June 19, 2007, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=equal-pay-
reality-check ("Last month, when the Supreme Court issued a majority opinion in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear denying employees the right to sue for discrimination after 180 days, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg was so incensed she read her scathing dissent aloud from the bench.").
129. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. See Rotunda, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
132. Ledbetter, 550 U.S at 661 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).
133. Brian P. O'Neill, Note, Pay Confidentially: A Remaining Obstacle to Equal Pay after
Ledbetter, 40 SETON HALL L. Rrev. 1217, 1218 (2010) (citing Carl Hulse, Republican Senators
Block Pay Discrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2008, at A22, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/04/24/washington/24cong.html).
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in January of 2009 to enact the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.134
On January 29, 2010, newly elected President Obama signed his first
bill into law, the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.'13
Section two of the Act directly addresses the Court's misinterpreta-
tion in Ledbetter.13 6 Section six clearly expresses Congress's intent to
make the bill retroactive to the day before the Supreme Court's mis-
taken interpretation in Ledbetter when it writes:
SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect as if en-
acted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of discrimination in com-
pensation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 621 et seq.), title I and section 503 of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990, and sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, that are pending on or after that date.137
Although the EEOC has not promulgated new notice and comment
regulations in response to the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, they
have expressed their interpretation that it is retroactive in at least two
ways.'3 8 First, their website states that the "Act has a retroactive ef-
fective date of May 28, 2007, and applies to all claims of discrimina-
tory compensation pending on or after that date."'13  They have also
updated the EEOC Compliance manual which now reads that "[a]n
aggrieved individual can bring a charge up to 180/300 days after re-
ceiving compensation that is affected by a discriminatory compensa-
134. Id.
135. Notice Concerning the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.
gov/laws/statutes/epa ledbetter.cfmhttp://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutesepa-ledbetter.cfmhttp://
www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/epaledbetter.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
136. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-2, § 2,123 Stat. 5 ("Congress finds
the following:
(1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007),
significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress
established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter
decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which
victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or
other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.
(2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of discriminatory compensation claims
ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust application of the civil
rights laws that Congress intended.
(3) With regard to any charge of discrimination under any law, nothing in this Act is intended
to preclude or limit an aggrieved person's right to introduce evidence of an unlawful employ-
ment practice that has occurred outside the time for filing a charge of discrimination.
(4) Nothing in this Act is intended to change current law treatment of when pension distribu-
tions are considered paid.").
137. Id. § 6 (emphasis added).
138. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
139. EEOC, supra note 135 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 34:1
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tion decision or other discriminatory practice, regardless of when the
discrimination began."" 0
E. Interplay between the Courts and the Legislature
This interplay between the Courts and Legislature is not unique to
Civil Rights statutes. Judge Satter, who served as a state legislator
prior to becoming a judge, describes the relationship as "symbi-
otic".141 Although this paper has already described four instances
where the Supreme Court has narrowed the civil rights provided by
statutes, 42 the courts have also at times been the branch of govern-
ment that has taken the lead on expanding civil rights in some circum-
stances. As Judge Satter explains:
For centuries, the courts developed the main body of law, called com-
mon law, through their judicial decisions. More recently, particularly
in the 1960s when courts failed to keep the law they had created in
tune with the enlightened common sense of the times, the legislature
acted to provide remedy in the form of statutory law. This dynamic
interplay between the legislature and the judiciary continues, as courts
constantly interpret statutes and apply them to cases they decide, and
legislatures, when they disagree with that interpretation, or its applica-
tion, amend the statutes. Also, when the legislature neglects or ref-
uses to deal with a situation that implicates fundamental rights, or
passes a law that violates such rights, the courts declare a constitu-
tional violation. Then the courts nullify the law and call upon the leg-
islature to provide a solution.14 3
Since legislatures are highly political institutions, they sometimes are
willing to let the courts "take the heat on controversial public policy
issues."1 4 4 By utilizing the legislative history of the ADAAA to inter-
pret the ADA, Judge Hamilton in AutoZone cured the Supreme
Court misinterpretations of the ADA in a manner reminiscent of the
state courts half a century ago. By inventing a clever way to cover
Shepherd under the ADA, Judge Hamilton effectively "took the heat"
for Congress's inability to make this sweeping legislation expressly
retroactive.
140. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, No. 915.003, sec.2-IV.C.4 (2009), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-IV-C-4 (last visited Apr. 11, 2011) (emphasis
added).
141. RoBERT SATER, UNDER TiL GoLo DOME: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT TIF CONNECTICUT
LEGISLATURE 258 (2d ed. 2009).
142. See discussion supra Parts LA, II.B-D.
143. SArI-R, supra note 141, at 258.
144. Id. at 271 (citing the courts finding Connecticut's method of school financing resulting in
racial inequalities unconstitutional and also a separate case finding welfare residency require-
ments unconstitutional); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (holding school financing sys-
tems based on local property taxes unconstitutional); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.
Conn. 1967) (holding public welfare requirements unconstitutional).
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III. THE HISTORY OF WORKPLACE DISABILITY LEGISLATION
A. The Original and Current Need for Disability Rights Legislation
In enacting the ADA, Congress in 1990 noted that people with disa-
bilities encounter employment discrimination.' 4 5 Congress found that
"census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that
people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our
society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, econom-
ically, and educationally."l 4 6 Although progress is evident in other
areas such as the reduction in architectural and transportation barri-
ers, the employment rates for people with disabilities has not changed
appreciably since the ADA was enacted.14 7 In March 2009, the em-
ployment rate of working-age people with disabilities was 16.8 percent
in contrast with an employment rate of working- age people without
disabilities of 76.5 percent.'4 8 The employment rate for people with
disabilities was down from 17.7 percent in the prior year, and well
below the peak of 28.8 percent in 1989.' ' The employment rate for
people with disabilities such as John Shepherd has therefore de-
creased since the original ADA was enacted in 1990.15o
B. The Precursor to the ADA: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973151 was the first national declaration
of the rights of people with disabilities.15 2 "Despite revisions meant to
145. 42 U.S.C § 12101(a)(5) (2008) ("individuals with disabilities continually encounter vari-
ous forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects
of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies,
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification stan-
dards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits,
jobs, or other opportunities . . . .").
146. Id. § 12101(a)(6) (emphasis added).
147. Melissa J. Bjelland, Richard Burkhauser, Sara von Schrader & Andrew Houtenville,
2009 Progress Report on the Economic Well-Being of Working-Age People with Disabilities, Ri-
HAmILIrrArON REisHAnC I AN) TRAINING CENR is ao EcoNomic Risi ARCII ON Emi'iroYMaNr
POIvICY O PERSONS wilH DisAmBILrmIS AT CORNIt.l UNIvIsusrry 3 (Sept. 2009), http://digital
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=edicollect. (This report is
based upon data from the 2009 and earlier Current Population Surveys - Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC, a.k.a. Annual Demographic Survey, Income Supplement,
and March CPS). "The CPS is the only dataset that provides continuously-defined yearly infor-
mation on the working-age population with disabilities since 1981. . . . The Census Bureau con-
ducts the CPS on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.").
148. Id. at 4.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 701
(1973)).
152. Rrnii COIKlIR & ADAM A. MIANI, FlimlJAL DisABLrry LAW IN A Nrr sin-I.i 34
(West 4th ed. 2010) (citing Section 504 of the act "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) [29 U.S.C.A. § 705(200], shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
[Vol. 34:1
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reduce the likelihood of a presidential veto, the bill had many signifi-
cant provisions." 153
Section 501 required the agencies of the federal government to take
affirmative action in the employing persons with disabilities. Section
502 established the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compli-
ance Board to oversee compliance of federal agencies with the Archi-
tectural Barriers Act. And Section 503 stipulated that any contract by
the federal government in excess of $2,500 contain a provision requir-
ing that contracting parties engage in affirmative action to employ and
advance in employment, handicapped workers.' 54
Section 504 forbids that any person with a disability "be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance."' In limiting the law to recipients of federal funding,
"Congress stopped short of imposing obligations on private employers
that could not pass along the costs of regulation to the federal
government."' 5 6
C. Another Independence Day: The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990
"Congress rarely writes on a clean slate, and the ADA is no excep-
tion to this rule. Congress drew heavily on section 504 and its regula-
tions when enacting the ADA."1 5 7 "By enacting the Title I of the
ADA in 1990 .. . congress took the additional step of imposing on all
employers subject to Title VII the duty not to discriminate against any
'qualified individual with a disability."' 5 " The Supreme Court had
previously broadly construed the definition of a person with a disabil-
ity under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in the case of School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline,15 9 and it was expected that the
ADA would improve the lives of people with disabilities. 60 President
George H.W. Bush, utilizing an analogy to the fall of the Berlin wall,
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service").
153. STEIlH.N L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBIIC POICY: THE PotIrICs OF
IMPLEMENTATION 54 (Univ. of Ala. Press Tuscaloosa & London 1989).
154. Id. at 55.
155. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 417 (B), 87 Stat. 394.
156. SAMUEL ESTREICIER & MICIIAEI. C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON EMPLoY-
MENT DIsCRIMINATION AND EMPIOYMENr LAw 493 (Thomson-West 3d ed. 2008).
157. Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. RiEv.
1119, 1131 (2010).
158. Estreicher, supra note 156, at 155.
159. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) ("We hold that a person suffering from the
contagious disease of tuberculosis can be a handicapped person within the meaning of § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and that respondent [school teacher] Arline is such a person.").
160. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 Stat. 933.
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described signing the ADA as taking "a sledgehammer to another
wall, one which has for too many generations separated Americans
with disabilities from the freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp.
Once again, we rejoice as this barrier falls for claiming together we
will not accept, we will not excuse, we will not tolerate discrimination
in America." 1 6 ' He also declared the signing another independence
day:
Three weeks ago we celebrated our nation's Independence Day. To-
day we're here to rejoice in and celebrate another "independence
day," one that is long overdue. With today's signing of the landmark
Americans for Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child with a
disability can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new
era of equality, independence, and freedom.' 62
As noted in part III.A, this exuberance did not come to fruition with
respect to employment of people with disabilities. This led advocates
for people with disabilities to seek reform.
D. Failed Reform: The ADA Restoration Acts of 2006 and 2007
"As a result of restrictive judicial interpretation of the definition of
disability, most scholars and disability advocates agree that the ADA
has not lived up to its promise of preventing discrimination and inte-
grating people with disabilities into the mainstream of society." 6 3
Chai Feldblum, currently an EEOC commissioner, was one of the
drafters of the original ADA and the ADAAA.1 64 She recounts the
history of the ADA Restoration Acts (ADARA) as follows:
161. Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
http://archive.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html (last modified July 26, 1990).
162. Id.
163. Wendy F. Hensel, Rights Resurgence: The Impact of the ADA Amendments on Schools
and Universities, 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 641, 652 (2009) (citing Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation
Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the "Disability Definition in the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. Ri.v. 1405, 1408 (1999) ("Although the ADA has
been hailed as the chief accomplishment of a civil rights movement on behalf of people with
disabilities, the way in which "disability" is defined in the statute has undercut its effectiveness as
a guarantor of civil rights."); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disabil-
ity Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 AtA. L. Rtv. 321, 369 (2000) (stating that
recent Supreme Court decisions "drastically curtailed the number of persons who may seek pro-
tection from discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA and seriously limited the
circumstances under which even individuals with obvious disabilities may seek protection from
discrimination."); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act,
35 GA. L. Ri'v. 27, 36 (2000) ("If the ADA was meant to be a revolutionary remaking of
America, then the judicial interpretation and implementation of the ADA's employment title
has been nothing less than a betrayal of the ADA's promise.").
164. Press Release, EEOC, Chai Feldblum Sworn in as a Commissioner Of the Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm. (April 7, 2010), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-7-10a.cfm
("Chai Feldblum, a former Georgetown University law professor, was sworn in today as a Com-
missioner of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).. . . Before becom-
ing a law professor, Feldblum played a leading role in drafting the ground-breaking Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 while serving as Legislative Counsel to the AIDS Project of the
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In late September 2006, Congressman Sensenbrenner presented
some members of the disability community with an ADA Restoration
Act that he wished to introduce before Congress adjourned. Although
most members of the disability community had not expected a bill to
be introduced until the following Congress, Congressman Sensenbren-
ner's enthusiasm and commitment presented an opportunity to begin
the momentum for such a bill in the 109th Congress.
Thus, on September 29, 2006, the last day of the session for the
109th Congress, Congressman Steny Hoyer (D-MD) and Congress-
man John Conyers, then-ranking member of the House Judiciary
Committee, joined Congressman Sensenbrenner in cosponsoring H.R.
6258, the first ADA Restoration Act to be introduced in Congress.
On July 26, 2007, the 17th anniversary of the ADA's passage, Ma-
jority Leader Hoyer and Congressman Sensenbrenner, and Senator
Harkin and Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), introduced companion
ADA Restoration bills (H.R. 3195 and S. 1881) that closely reflected
the draft bill that had been developed by the disability community
lawyers.165
"As support for ADARA grew over time, the business community
voiced its opposition to the bill. Similar concerns were echoed by the
Justice Department on behalf of the Bush Administration."1 6 6 The
business community had two main concerns:
First, because the bill defined a disability as an "impairment" (remov-
ing the "substantially limits" and "major life activity" language), busi-
ness advocates predicted that it "would unquestionably expand ADA
coverage to encompass almost any physical or mental impairment."
Employers feared that removing this language would cover up to 95%
of the workforce. Second, the business community expressed concern
that the "qualified individual" requirement would become an affirma-
tive defense rather than part of the plaintiff's case. The DOJ also op-
posed the bill. 167
The ADARA of 2007 also never came to fruition before the close of
the legislative session. 6 8
American Civil Liberties Union. Later, as a law professor, she was equally instrumental in help-
ing with the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.").
165. Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of2008,
13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 187, 197-98 (2008).
166. Hensel, supra note 163, at 653.
167. Hillary K. Valderrama, Is the ADAAA a "Quick Fix" Or Are We Out of the Frying Pan
and into the Fire?: How Requiring Parties to Participate in the Interactive Process Can Effect
Congressional Intent under the ADAAA, 47 Hous. L. REV. 175, 198 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
168. Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEo L. RIv.
331, 359 (2010) ("This bill [The ADARA of 2007], however, also never came to fruition."); see
also U.S. Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress (2007 - 2008) S.1881,
Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2007, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d110:S1881: (last updated Nov. 15, 2007).
29
Melkey: Creating New Law or Restoring the Old - Retroactivity and the Ame
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2011
30 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW
E. Restoration Accomplished: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
"In the legislative history of the ADAAA, Congress asserted that it
was restoring the ADA to what it was originally intended to be. In
fact, the first version of what later become the ADAAA made this
clear in its very name, "The Americans with Disabilities Restoration
Act" (ADARA)."'I6 9 In February 2008, the first negotiation session
occurred between representatives of the disability community and of
the business community; thirteen weeks later after numerous hearings
and multiple drafts, a final compromise was reached.170 The ADAAA
was significantly different than its predecessor the ADARA in one
important regard: "it [the ADARA] proposed an open-ended, virtu-
ally unlimited protected class, eliminating the substantial limitation re-
quirement and providing that an individual need only have an
impairment to have a statutory disability.""' "'Impairment' has con-
sistently received a very broad interpretation even as courts were con-
struing other parts of the definition of disability narrowly."' 7 2 This
approach under the ADARA was consistent with disability rights' ma-
jor goal of "[e]liminating the probing first stage inquiry into the exis-
tence of disability."17 3  However the final version of the ADAAA
"keeps the original [ADA] 'substantial limitation' language, but
deletes the 'materially restricts' definition and instead adds Rules of
Construction designed to clarify Congress' intent regarding how 'sub-
169. Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA Amend-
ments Act, 55 WAYNI L. Rjiv. 1267, 1270 (2009); 110 CONG. REC. S8345 (2008) (statement of
Managers to Accompany S. 3406, Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008)
(asserting that the intent of the Act is to "establish a degree of limitation required for an impair-
ment to qualify as a disability that is consistent with what Congress originally intended, a degree
lower than courts have construed it to be"); Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of
2007, S. 1881, 110th Cong. (2007).
170. Feldblum, supra note 165, at 229-30. ("On February 19, 2008, the first negotiation ses-
sion occurred between representatives of the disability community and of the business commu-
nity. At the first negotiation session, the group signed an agreement that if the discussions
resulted in acceptable compromise language, both parties to the discussion would defend the
deal before members of Congress and, as changes were put forward during the legislative pro-
cess-as presumably they would be-both sides would have to agree to such changes in order
for "the deal" to hold. After thirteen weeks of meetings between the disability and business
negotiating teams, endless drafting and redrafting of legislative language (and agreement on a
generic new name for the bill), and numerous meetings and calls for internal vetting within the
separate communities (including lengthy meetings of the Drafting & Analysis Group, as well as
numerous meetings with the larger disability community), a final compromise was reached on
May 15, 2008. The "deal" language formed the basis of the "ADA Amendments Act of 2008"
(ADAAA). Offered as an amendment to H.R. 3195 in the nature of a substitute during House
Committee markups, the ADAAA was voted out of the House Education and Labor Committee
by a vote of 43-1, and out of the Judiciary Committee by a vote of 27-0, both on June 18, 2008.
On June 25, 2008, the House of Representatives passed the ADAAA by an overwhelming vote
of 402-17.) (footnotes omitted).
171. Anderson, supra note 169, at 1270.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1286.
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stantial limitation' is to be interpreted." 7 4 This compromise bill had
strong bipartisan support, passing the Senate and House unanimously
in September 2008."17 President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA
on September 25, 2008 - eighteen years and two months after his
father signed the original ADA.176
The ADAAA specifically overturned the Sutton and Williams Su-
preme Court decisions misinterpreting the ADA,' and restored the
law on a the definition of a disability to be consistent with the pre-
ADA Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Supreme Court decision in Arline.s7 8
In doing so, the definition of a person with a disability had come full
circle to where it stood on the day the ADA was originally enacted.
This is the definition that Judge Hamilton applied in AutoZone. 79
IV. OTHER CIRCUITS SHOULD ADOPT THE REASONING
OF AUTOZONE
A. Equal Protection Cases Have Historically Utilized a Similar
Approach
The sleight of hand Judge Hamilton performed in AutoZone 80 is
not a new maneuver. The Supreme Court has used a similar method-
ology in Equal Protection cases when it clearly stated a rule (an intent
requirement), but then did not apply the rule (instead relying on evi-
dence of disparate impact)."'
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davisl82 that "in
the absence of a racially discriminatory purpose, a facially neutral gov-
ernmental action having an adverse racial impact would not be subject
to strict scrutiny." 83  Commentators agree that "current doctrine
174. Id. at 1287; ADAAA § 3(2); ADAAA § 4(a).
175. Feldblum, supra note 165, at 239-40 (citing 154 CONG. REC. S8342 (2008); 154 CONo.
REC. H8286 (2008)).
176. Feldblum, supra note 165, at 240; See generally White House, Statement on the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, (Sept. 17, 2008) available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.
gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080917-9.htmi (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) ("The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 is instrumental in allowing individuals with disabilities to fully partici-
pate in our economy and society, and the Administration supports efforts to enhance its protec-
tions. The Administration believes that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which has just
passed Congress, is a step in that direction, and is encouraged by the improvements made to the
bill during the legislative process. The President looks forward to signing the ADAAA into
law").
177. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
178. See Bjelland, ET. AL., supra note 147 and accompanying text.
179. See EEOC v. AutoZone Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 641 n.3 (2010); see also Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 8-112, 87 Stat. 355.
180. See supra Part LA, notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 SrAN. L. REv.
1105 (1989).
182. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
183. Ortiz, supra note 181, at 1105.
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makes intent the key to equal protection and nearly all agree why."'
In Washington v. Davis, several black police officers charged that the
hiring and promotion policies used by the District of Columbia's po-
lice department discriminated against them in violation of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.'"8 "In particular,
they argued that a written test developed by the Civil Service Com-
mission for general federal use and employed by the District to test
verbal ability and reading and comprehension skills had a highly ad-
verse impact on blacks."l 8 6 The Supreme Court held that black police
officers had to show, not only disparate impact, but also discrimina-
tory purpose, which they failed to do.'8 "By itself, the evidence of
adverse impact could not establish such a purpose, and the remaining
evidence in the case-including special efforts by the police depart-
ment to recruit blacks and the test's admittedly legitimate aim of im-
proving the verbal skills of public employees-served to rebut any
suggestion of discriminatory motivation."" The Court in two more
cases decided over the next three years confirmed this seemingly strict
intent requirement.189
The voting case of Rogers v. Lodge' is one example where the
court stated the rule for equal protection cases that evidence of intent,
not merely disparate impact is required, but then used a sleight of
hand to go around the rule.19' In Rogers, Black plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of the at-large election system used in Burke
County, Georgia, where no Black had ever been elected despite com-
prising 54 percent of the population and 38 percent of registered vot-
ers.' "The Court reaffirmed that intent was the central inquiry, but
it then proceeded to find intent in an aggregate of factors having at
best an indirect bearing on motivation."1 9 3  As Professor Ortiz
explains:
184. Id. (citing Gayle Binion, 'Intent' and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP.
CT. REV. 397, 403-04 (describing consensus amongst various commentators)).
185. Id. at 1110 n.26 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), for the proposition that
the Supreme Court implicitly held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment contains
an equal protection component that applies against the federal government).
186. Id. at 1110-11 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 237).
187. Id. at 1111 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 245-48).
188. Id. at 1111 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 245-46).
189. Id. at 1106; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp,
429 U.S. 252 (1977); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
190. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
191. See id. at 621-22.
192. Ortiz, supra note 181 at 1127 (citing Rogers, 458 U.S. at 614-15).
193. Id. (citing Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623-27). "In particular, the Court found discriminatory
intent substantiated by the following factors: (i) that blacks constituted a majority of the county's
overall population but a distinct minority of its registered voters; (ii) the presence of bloc racial
voting; (iii) the fact that no black candidates had ever won election; (iv) past discrimination
against blacks in voting, including the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and white primaries, which
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[T]he overall result . .. is to make intent largely coextensive with ad-
verse impact in voting cases. By allowing adverse impact plus evidence
of past governmental discrimination in decisions unrelated to the
adoption or maintenance of the at-large system to demonstrate intent,
the Court moves . . . far away . . . from any traditional conception of
intent as motivation.' 94
Professor Ortiz also cites similar examples in both the juror selec-
tionl 9 5 and educationl 9 6 contexts. Judge Hamilton used a similar
methodology when he clearly stated the rule (the ADAAA is not ret-
roactive), but then proceeded to apply ADAAA principals to the in-
stant case by using the legislative history of the ADAAA to establish
the intent of Congress close to two decades earlier.
Judge Hamilton's approach is different in one way from the Equal
Protection cases described above. The Equal Protection cases de-
scribed above state the correct legal rule (intent required), and then
marshal the facts in to meet the requirements of the rule. On the
other hand, Judge Hamilton stated the correct legal rule (no retroac-
tivity), but then proceeded to use the legislative history of the
ADAAA to illuminate the original meaning of the ADA. The ap-
proach taken by the lower courts in the Equal Protection cases may be
more immune to being overturned on appeal because findings of fact
are reviewed deferentially under a "clearly erroneous standard," while
the question of law about the meaning of the statute in the ADA
had a continuing effect on black registration rates; (v) past discrimination against blacks in edu-
cation; (vi) past discrimination in political party affairs and primaries; (vii) property ownership
requirements that made it difficult for blacks to serve as chief registrar of the county; (viii) past
discrimination in grand jury selection, county hiring, and appointment to county boards and
committees; (ix) unresponsiveness and insensitivity of elected officials to the needs of the black
community; (x) the depressed socioeconomic conditions of blacks; (xi) the large geographic size
of the county, which made it difficult for blacks to reach polling places; (xii) a requirement of
repeated runoff elections until one candidate received a majority of the votes cast; (xiii) a re-
quirement that candidates run for specific seats, which prevented a cohesive political group from
focusing their support on a single candidate; and (xiv) the absence of a residency requirement,
which allowed all the commissioners to come from a single, perhaps 'lily white,' part of the
county." Id.
194. Id. at 1129.
195. Id. at 1119-26; see, e.g. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (finding that the State
failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination by competent testimony of those
involved in the selection of the grand jury, despite two opportunities to do so, resulted in a
denial of equal protection of the law in the grand jury selection process in respondent's case);
see, e.g. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that prosecutors using preemptory
challenges to exclude all back jurors in a criminal case come forward with a neutral explanation
for his action).
196. Id. at 1131-34; see, e.g Columbus Bd. of Edu. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (holding
that plaintiffs could satisfy the intent requirement by showing that the district had acted pur-
posefully to segregate the schools as far back as the time of Brown v. Board of Education); e.g.
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (also holding that plaintiffs could
satisfy the intent requirement by showing that the district had acted purposefully to segregate
the schools as far back as the time of Brown v. Board of Education).
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would be reviewed de novo.'" Judge Hamilton did not say that he
was not following the Supreme Court precedent; instead he chose not
to utilize it, instead relying on the legislative history of the
ADAAA.i"8 Judge Hamilton's approach to statutory construction
may be more vulnerable to be overturned with de novo review than
the Equal Protection cases were, but the Supreme Court would be in
the position where they would have to tell the lower courts to specifi-
cally follow their misinterpretation of the statute. The author suspects
that there are not five votes on the current Supreme Court willing to
do so.
197. Fio. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); see also Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the
Federal Courts: An Empirical Study, 2012 UiAl L. Rry. Vol. 1 (Forthcoming 2012); Pepperdine
University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011/12, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract= 1805999:
The organization of the federal judiciary is premised on the division of labor between trial
and appellate courts, the boundaries of which are delineated by the standards of review. The
standard of review divides trial court decisions into three broad categories, each of which is
subject to a different standard: (1) conclusions of law, (2) fact-finding, and (3) discretionary
rulings. Trial court conclusions of law, or what Hart and Sacks called the 'law declaration'
function, specify what consequences legal doctrine attaches to various factual situations,
including the factual situation as found by the trial court. Trial court fact finding is the
process of determining the historical facts relevant to the case, or what has been called 'a
case-specific inquiry into what happened here.' Discretionary rulings typically include trial
court decisions on detailed questions of trial supervision, procedure, and evidence. Each of
these basic components of the adjudicative process-law, fact, and discretion-is subject to
its own level of appellate scrutiny according to a 'standard of review.
The decisions in the first category-questions of law-are reviewed 'de novo' by the ap-
pellate court, meaning that the appellate court is not required or expected to give any defer-
ence to the trial court. Instead, the appellate court exercises its own judgment on the legal
questions presented, exercising a form of review sometimes referred to as 'free, indepen-
dent, or even plenary review.' In such cases, '[tihe appellate courts merely ask themselves
whether they agree with the trial judge's resolution of the legal issue. If not, they reverse
him quick as a flash. . .' The appellate court is entitled to-and should-take into account
the legal analysis of the trial court, but the appellate court has the right and even the duty to
exercise its own independent judgment.
In contrast to legal conclusions, factual determinations by the trial court are reviewed deferen-
tially. Appellate review of factual findings by the district court is limited to whether those find-
ings are 'clearly erroneous,' a very high bar to reversal of a trial judge's factual findings. The
clear error standard does not require that there be no evidence to support the finding. Instead,
as the canonical formulation of the clearly erroneous standard suggests, a finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
The key point is that the standard of review constrains the appellate court to defer to the trial
court's findings of fact, meaning that the appeal is primarily an appeal of legal issues, not a new
trial of the whole case. Indeed, the conventional wisdom on review of findings of fact is very
simple: 'appellate courts do not engage in factual evaluation,' so that the clear error review is
"usually cited to justify refusal to interfere with the fact findings made in the trial court.") (foot-
notes omitted).
198. See supra Part I.A.
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B. The ADA Should Be Construed Broadly to Restore Its Original
Intentions as Expressed in the ADAAA
The text of the ADAAA indicates that the original intent of the
ADA was that coverage under this remedial act was to be construed
broadly seven times.' 99 It also resets the definition of disability back
to how it existed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as interpreted
by Arline prior to the passage of the original ADA.2 0 0 I agree with
Professor Colker, writing before the introduction of the ADAAA,
that "[t]he application of the civil rights canon should be an inherent
part of the judicial process. . . . Broad construction of civil rights is as
old as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; it is
time for that rule of construction, once again, to become a mainstay of
the interpretation of civil rights laws."201 One way to produce the re-
sults originally commanded by Congress is to not abandon people
with disabilities in cases which are currently in the pipeline. Applying
the legislative history of the ADAAA to interpretation of the ADA
would be consistent with both the original congressional intent,2 02 and
the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. 20 3
V. CONCLUSION
Congress stated, in enacting the ADA, that it sought to protect a
discrete and insular minority.20 4 It further stated it wanted to provide
meaningful protection in Title I for employment discrimination.20 5
"The Supreme Court undermined this basic intention by construing
the protected class so narrowly that it has virtually become a nullity in
the employment context." 20 6 Although the text of the ADAAA may
not be able to be directly applied to cases in the pipeline, it can be
used to clarify the original intent of the ADA. While the mechanism
is different, the net effect of this approach is a type of retroactive ap-
plication for people with disabilities such as John Shepherd who were
stuck in the pipeline.
199. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
200. Id. at § 2(b)(3) (". . . and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third
prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").
201. Colker, supra note 10, at 64.
202. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3553 ("[In
enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act
'provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities' and provide broad coverage[.]").
203. See supra Part IV.A.
204. Colker, supra note 10, at 64; see generally 42 U.S.C § 12101(a)(7).
205. Colker, supra note 10, at 62; see generally 42 U.S.C §§ 12111-17.
206. Colker, supra note 10, at 62.
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On remand, a trial court in Illinois recently returned a verdict of
$600,000 against AutoZone, Inc. for failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation to John Shepherd; an additional claim for $115,000 in
back pay will be decided by the presiding judge at a later date.20 7 Af-
ter first getting past the threshold issue of whether Mr. Shepherd had
a disability, when the case subsequently went to trial the EEOC
presented evidence that mopping floors was a non-essential function
of the sales manager position that could have been reassigned to other
employees, and that Shepherd could perform all of the essential func-
tions of his job.2 08 Shepherd testified that that he asked not to be
assigned mopping and supported his request with documentation of
his impairment.2 09 The EEOC's evidence at trial indicated that in
2003, new store management refused the request and required Shep-
herd to mop, leading to further injury and necessitating a medical
leave. 2 o This case proceeded past the threshold question of coverage
under the ADA because Judge Hamilton was willing to interpret the
original ADA as covering Mr. Shepherd.2 1 ' Getting past this thresh-
old issue is critical for people with disabilities. As the EEOC regional
attorney stated after the verdict, "[j]uries well understand that provid-
ing reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities is criti-
cal to keeping them on the job and moving the economy forward.
They get it, and employers should too." 2 12
Others who are similarly situated should likewise not be penalized
for the lack of express retroactivity in the ADAAA. For example,
employers should not question whether an employee undergoing dial-
ysis for kidney failure is covered under the ADA. 2 13 The EEOC re-
ports that as of April 28, 2011, there were 3081 ADA charges pending
with one or more alleged acts of discrimination occurring before the
January 1, 2009 effective date of the ADAAA; 1916 of these were
207. Press Release, EEOC Obtains $600,000 Verdict Against AutoZone For Failure To Ac-
commodate Disabled Employee (June 6, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-3-
11e.cfm.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part L.A.
212. See Press Release, EEOC, supra, note 207 (for a more detailed discussion of the re-
quirements of the reasonable accommodation process, see Frederick J. Melkey, Note, The
Emerging Trend of Extending ADA Reasonable Accommodation beyond the Workplace to In-
clude Commuting Issues: A comment on Colwell v. Rite Aid, 7 Moo. AM. 22, 25-31 (2011)
(describing the statutory text, EEOC regulations, and Supreme Court precedent related to the
reasonable accommodation obligations of the ADA)).
213. Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding kidney
failure to be disabling because eliminating waste from one's body is a major life activity).
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filed after the January 1, 2009.214 This is a significant number of peo-
ple currently caught without the protection that Congress intended in
enacting the ADA nearly two decades ago.
One additional implication for future civil rights restorative laws is
that retroactivity should be expressly stated to receive full effect. The
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is a recent example where Congress was
clear in the text of the statute that it meant to restore the law to the
way it existed before the Supreme Court decision with which it dis-
agreed.2 1 5 But that is not the only way. If that is not politically feasi-
ble, a back-up for civil rights advocates is to include restorative
language to aid cases in the pipeline. Following the approach utilized
by Judge Hamilton in AutoZone, laws that are purely restorative can
be used as an aid in the statutory construction of the original law,
bypassing the requirement of express retroactivity.2 1 6
Most ADA cases in the pipeline have perpetuated the "Goldilocks
Dilemma" 2 1 7 by applying the overturned Sutton and Williams deci-
sions.2 18 In the fairy tale, when Baby Bear locates Goldilocks sleeping
in her bed, she awakens and runs away; never to be seen again.2 1 9 If
other courts apply Judge Hamilton's approach in AutoZone, the re-
gressive effects of Sutton and Williams will likewise disappear, never to
be seen again.
214. Letter from Stephanie Garner, Assistant Legal Counsel, Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, Response to FOIA Request No. 820-2011-139055 (May 18, 2011) (on file with
author).
215. See supra Part II.D.
216. See supra Part L.A.
217. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
219. The Story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, DLTK's CRA-rs FOR Kims, http://www.
dltk-teach.com/rhymes/goldilocks-story.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011)
They decided to look around some more and when they got upstairs to the bedroom, Papa
bear growled, 'Someone's been sleeping in my bed.' 'Someone's been sleeping in my bed,
too' said the Mama bear. 'Someone's been sleeping in my bed and she's still there!' ex-
claimed Baby bear. Just then, Goldilocks woke up and saw the three bears. She screamed,
'Help!' And she jumped up and ran out of the room. Goldilocks ran down the stairs,
opened the door, and ran away into the forest. And she never returned to the home of the
three bears. (emphasis added).
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